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In Peru’s national elections on April 9, Ollanta Humala of the nationalist Union for 
Peru (UP) party is currently leading in national polls (with 31 percent) against the 
center-right candidate Lourdes Flores Nano of the National Unity (UN) party (26 
percent) and former president Alan Garcia of the American Popular Revolutionary 
Alliance (APRA) party (23 percent).
1  Regardless of whether Humala wins a 
majority, or the election goes to a second round in May, the former Army officer’s 
rapid rise in the polls is another example of the political shift toward populist, 
nationalist, and regionalist politics and economic policy in Latin America. 
 
Humala has expressed these ideas repeatedly in his campaign: “[N]ationalism is the 
defense of our sovereignty and our resources.  It is our answer to the neoliberal 
economic model that is destroying Peruvian society.”
2  In the last several years, six 
presidents who ran explicitly against the “neoliberal” economic reforms of the last 
25 years have won elections in South America.
3  The most likely reason for this 
continuing political trend is the long-term economic growth failure in Latin 
America. From 1980-2000, per capita GDP grew by only 9 percent; for 2000-2005, 
it was 1 percent. By contrast, GDP per person grew by 82 percent in the two 
decades from 1960-1980.
4 The last quarter century has seen the worst growth 
performance for any 25-year period in more than a century in Latin America, and 
this economic failure has had enormous consequences that will continue to spill 
over into the political sphere. This issue brief will provide some economic 
background information on Peru that may be relevant to the current election. 
 
 
*Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Luis Sandoval and Patty Kupfer 
provided valuable research assistance.
                                                 
1 El Comercio and Apoyo, April 2, 2006, (http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/EdicionOnline/Html/2006-04-
02/onlPortada0482452.html). 
2 “No soy de izquierda ni de derecha,” Página-12, April 4, 2006, (http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elmundo/4-65164-2006-
04-04.html). 
3 See Weisbrot and Sandoval (2006) “Bolivia’s Challenges,” p. 5, 
(http://www.cepr.net/publications/bolivia_challenges_2006_03.pdf). 
4 From IMF (2005) World Economic Outlook, September, and Penn World Tables. 
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Growth, Employment, and Poverty 
 
Unlike the other six candidates who have run successfully against neoliberalism, Humala is running 
in an economy that has grown reasonably well under the current president, Alejandro Toledo. Table 
1 shows the recent data for growth and other indicators for Peru’s economy. Real GDP grew by an 
average of 5.5 percent annually over the last four years. Per capita GDP, a better measure of 
economic progress because it factors out population growth, grew by an average of 4.0 percent.
5 
While this is not near the highest ranges of even long-term developing country growth experiences,
6 
it is solid growth, especially by Latin American standards.  
 
Toledo’s low approval ratings – currently at 22 percent (they had dipped as low as 8 percent in 2004) 
– and Humala’s rise in the polls have led many observers to conclude that Peru’s recent economic 
growth, while successful, has not “trickled down” enough to the majority of Peruvians. While there 
is some truth to this idea (see below), the much more important feature of Peru’s economic reality is 
the country’s long-term economic failure. 
 
Figure 1 shows real per capita GDP in Peru since 1960. As can be seen from the graph, Peru’s GDP 
per capita peaked in 1981 and is only now just returning to that level. In other words, income per 
person in Peru – the most basic economic measure of living standards – is currently about the same 
as it was 25 years ago. This is a remarkable long-term economic failure, and as noted above it 
follows the economic stagnation of the region, although it is somewhat worse than average. 
 
A long-term growth and development failure of this magnitude produces economic and social 
problems, including unemployment and poverty, that cannot be resolved with a few years of 
reasonable economic growth. It is the cumulative results of this long-term economic failure that is 
most likely driving the electoral shifts of recent years in the region, and therefore Peru’s exceptional 
growth over the last four years is a much lesser influence. 
 
Table 2 shows Peru’s poverty rate for the years 2001-2004. As can be seen, measured poverty 
declined somewhat over this period, from 54.3 to 51.6 percent of the population. It is undoubtedly 
somewhat lower today due to the strong economic growth since 2004. But this is not a dramatic 
decline and could go unnoticed by much of the electorate, and it still (as of 2004) leaves a majority 
of the population living below the official poverty line. In Lima and Callao, where 9 million people 
(or 32 percent of the population) live, poverty actually increased during this period by nearly 5 
percentage points, from 31.8 to 36.6 percent of the population. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the last few years of growth have not been enough to lower the 
unemployment rate, which has increased to 10.5 percent, from 7.8 percent in 2001.
7 Also, the 
employment to population ratio in 2004 (at 55.8 percent) was down nearly 4 percentage points from 
2000 (59.7 percent) and even more from its peak in 1998. This decline is substantial and indicates 
that the economy has not been creating nearly enough jobs even to keep pace with the growth in the  
                                                 
5 For both of these measures we are comparing the last quarter of 2005 to the last quarter of 2001(www.bcrp.gob.pe); 
this is the closest approximation that the data allow for President Toledo’s term of office which began in July of 2002, 
although his actual term of office (July 2002-July 2006) is likely to show somewhat lower growth. 
6 China has grown by an average of 8.2 percent per capita over the last 25 years; South Korea averaged 6.2  percent per 
capita from 1960-2005. 
7 This measures only urban unemployment. 




Peru: Selected Social Indicators, 2000-2004
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Poverty
Total ... 54.3 53.8 52.2 51.6
Lima and Callao Province ... 31.8 34.2 33.7 36.6
Rest of population ... 63.3 61.8 59.6 57.7
      Urban ... 50 46.4 44.1 43.3
      Rural ... 77.1 77.7 75.7 72.5
Employment (Lima Only)
Unemployment rate 7.8 8.8 9.7 10.3 10.5
Employment-to-population ratio 58.4 59.7 56.8 56.7 55.8
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica, Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo
TABLE 1
Peru: Basic Economic Indicators, 2000-2005
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Real GDP (millions of 1994 Nuevos Soles) 120,882 121,103 127,087 132,119 138,474 147,708
Real GDP (annual % change) 2.94 0.18 4.93 3.98 4.80 6.67
Real GDP per capita (annual % change) 1.28 -1.37 3.36 2.43 3.29 5.14
Consumer prices, end of period (annual % 
change) 3.74 -0.13 1.52 2.48 2.80 1.50
 
Public Sector
General government current revenue 17.8 17.2 17.2 17.6 17.8 18.5
General government noninterest expenditure 18.5 17.8 17.4 17.3 17.0 17.2
Combined public sector overall balance -3.3 -2.5 -2.3 -1.7 -1.1 -1.4
Debt
Total Public Debt* … 41.7 43.4 43.9 40.7 37.3
External 36.5 34.6 36.6 37.4 34.3 29.5
Domestic … 7.0 6.8 6.5 6.4 7.8
Memorandum Item:
Nominal GDP (millions of $) 52,661 54,797 56,573 60,911 71,381 75,473
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas
* Does not include regional governments
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Source: Maddison (2005) and author’s calculations 
 
 
labor force. Although there are problems with all of these official data in terms of how well they 
measure the employment situation of the whole labor force, they indicate that the economic growth 
of the last four years has not brought noticeable improvements in living standards to a large part of 
Peru’s labor force. 
 
Economic Indicators and Issues 
 
Whoever wins the election will inherit an economy that is sound on a number of macroeconomic 
indicators in addition to growth, and does not appear to suffer from any dangerous macroeconomic 
imbalances. Inflation is well under control with consumer prices rising only 1.5 percent in 2005. The 
public sector deficit was 0.7 percent of GDP in 2002, and is projected at 1.0 percent of GDP for 
2006. The public sector debt is projected at 37.1 percent of GDP for 2006, down from 47.1 percent 
of GDP for 2002. 
 
The government is currently running a trade surplus of $5.2 billion or 6.8 percent of GDP; its 
current account surplus is much lower, at $1.03 billion or 1.4 percent of GDP, primarily due to debt 
service (see Table 3). But it is still significantly improved from a $1.06 billion (1.9 percent of GDP) 
current account deficit in 2002. Foreign exchange reserves have grown substantially from $9.7 
billion to $13.1 billion, or 17.4 percent of GDP, for 2005. 
 
These measures of economic stability will certainly make it easier for Peru’s new government to 
pursue any economic program that it chooses. 
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TABLE 3






Total, In Millions of current US dollars
2000 -1,526 -410 6,955 7,366
2001 -1,144 -195 7,026 7,221
2002 -1,063 292 7,714 7,422
2003 -934 836 9,091 8,255
2004 -10 2,793 12,616 9,824
2005 1,030 5,163 17,247 12,084
Annual % change
2000 -- -- 14.3 9.2
2001 -- -- 1.0 -2.0
2002 -- -- 9.8 2.8
2003 -- -- 17.9 11.2
2004 -- -- 38.8 19.0
2005 -- -- 36.7 23.0
In % of GDP
2000 -2.9 -0.8 13.2 14.0
2001 -2.1 -0.4 12.8 13.2
2002 -1.9 0.5 13.6 13.1
2003 -1.5 1.4 14.9 13.6
2004 0.0 3.9 17.7 13.8
2005 1.4 6.8 22.9 16.0
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru
 
The current government is operating under a 26-month Stand-By Arrangement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that expires in August. Humala’s campaign has announced that 
it would not seek a new agreement with the IMF, saying that “the economic indicators for the future 
don’t point to the need for a new agreement.”
8 The data would seem to support this statement, and 
Peru would be following a regional and worldwide trend of countries choosing not to borrow from 
the IMF.
9 This does not appear to be a major campaign issue, although it could be seen as part of 
the Humala campaign’s overall rejection of the “neoliberal” reforms of the last 25 years, since the 
IMF is widely seen as having promoted these reforms. 
 
A somewhat bigger issue is the proposed Free Trade Agreement with the United States, for which 
Peru finished negotiations in December, but has not yet ratified. Humala has pledged to renegotiate 
                                                 
8 “Peru’s Humala Wouldn’t Renew IMF Loan Agreement,” Bloomberg, March 31, 2006 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=a5hEmw8Ecr.4&refer=latin_america) 
9 See Weisbrot and Sandoval (2006) “Bolivia’s Challenges,” pp. 10-11, 
(http://www.cepr.net/publications/bolivia_challenges_2006_03.pdf) 
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the agreement.
10 This is also part of a growing trend in the region – e.g. the proposed Free Trade 
Area of the Americas, which was launched nearly 12 years ago, now appears nearly dead. Countries 
have become increasingly wary of commercial agreements that threaten to harm their agricultural or 
in some cases key industrial sectors, and impose new protections for intellectual property – beyond 
those agreed to in the World Trade Organization – that would raise the price of medicines. 
 
In the past, more countries were willing to take these risks and even make economic sacrifices in 
return for access to a rapidly growing U.S. market for their exports. However, the United States is 
now running a trade deficit of 7 percent of GDP, which most economists view as unsustainable.
11 
Even under generous assumptions about how much foreign debt the U.S. can sustain, an adjustment 
is inevitable over the next decade. The dollar will have to fall in order for the U.S. trade deficit to 
adjust, not to balanced trade but to a deficit that can be sustained without an explosive foreign debt 
trajectory. This means that the U.S. import market, instead of growing as it did in the past, can 
actually be expected to shrink over the next decade.
12 The implication is that countries hoping to 
increase their access to the U.S. market for their exports will find that they can only do so by 
displacing countries that are already there, such as Mexico or China. This economic reality provides 
considerable grounds for caution for any country considering making economic sacrifices in order to 
gain access to the U.S. market. At the same time, the Chinese import market is projected to grow by 
about $1 trillion euros over the next decade, making the U.S. market – whatever its size and 
shrinkage – increasingly less important for countries like Peru. 
 
Table 4 shows Peru’s exports, with some sorting by category, since 2000. As can be seen from the 
table, total exports soared from $7.03 billion to $17.25 billion from 2001 to 2005. This is an 
enormous 145 percent increase in export revenue in just 4 years.
13 While the increased export 
production did account for about a third of the real GDP growth in the last four years,
14 the impact 
of this export revenue on economic and social development – exports are currently about 23 percent 
of GDP – could conceivably have been bigger.  Real per capita social spending by the government, 
for example, increased by about 2.5 percent annually from 2001 to 2005; but most of this was in the 
election year 2002, with the last three years seeing increases of less than 1.3 percent annually.
15  
 
The idea that the country’s poor majority may not have benefited sufficiently from the country’s 
natural resources – especially during a boom in exports of these products – is another election issue, 
as it was in Bolivia and Venezuela. This is the situation that candidate Humala has pledged to rectify. 
From Table 4, it can be seen that the mining sector accounted for the largest part of the increased 
export revenue since 2001 – about $6.5 billion of the $10.2 billion increase. Copper ($2.7 billion 
increase) and gold ($2 billion increase) were the leading minerals, with oil and oil derivatives also 
rising by $1.1 billion. Most of the increased revenue in these sectors was due to increased world 
market prices, and only secondarily to increased production. 
 
                                                 
10 See “Peru nationalist targets global mining groups,” by Hal Weitzman, The Financial Times, March 30, 2006. 
11 See e.g. Cline (2005), The United States as a Debtor Nation: Risks and Policy Reform. Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC. 
12 This is measured in non-dollar currencies. See Baker and Weisbrot (2004) “Fool’s Gold: Projections of the U.S. 
Import Market,” (http://www.cepr.net/publications/trade_2004_01_08.htm) 
13 These are current dollars, but U.S. CPI inflation was only 8.5 percent for this four-year period. 
14 IMF (2006), “Peru: Third Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement,” IMF Country Report No. 06/47, Washington, 
DC, p. 5. 
15 Ibid, p. 34. 
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TABLE 4
Peru: Value of Exports, 2000-2005
In millions of current US dollars
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Exports 6,955 7,026 7,714 9,091 12,617 17,247
Traditional Exports 4,805 4,730 5,369 6,356 9,028 12,840
Agriculture and Fisheries 1,204 1,134 1,109 1,046 1,429 1,634
Mining 3,220 3,205 3,809 4,690 6,953 9,724
Copper 933 986 1,187 1,260 2,446 3,360
Gold 1,145 1,166 1,501 2,102 2,383 3,140
Zinc 496 419 429 529 577 805
Others 647 634 692 799 1,547 2,419
Oil and Oil Products 381 391 451 621 646 1,482
Nontraditional Exports 2,044 2,183 2,256 2,620 3,476 4,271
Agriculture and Fisheries 571 634 714 828 1,076 1,332
Textiles 701 664 677 823 1,092 1,274
Chemicals 212 247 256 316 415 538
Metal Products and Jewelry 265 243 222 262 392 493
Others 295 396 388 391 501 635
Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru
 
According to Peru’s Ministry of the Economy and Finance, Yanacocha, a company owned by the 
U.S. - based Newmont Corporation, exported $1.5 billion in gold last year
16 and did not pay 
royalties, although it paid other taxes. There are a number of mining companies that have “tax 
stability” contracts and don’t have to pay royalties, which are otherwise set at 3 percent. According 
to the mining and energy companies’ trade association, mining companies paid about $874 million in 
taxes last year.
17 As has been the case elsewhere in the region, it does look like there is room for the 




The Peruvian election is following some trends that are common to the region, which have their 
basis in important regional economic factors. The most important of these is the long-term growth 
failure over the last 25 years, which many have blamed on the economic reforms that have been 
implemented over this period. As a result, candidates who campaign against “neoliberalism” will 
probably find this to their advantage for some time to come, as different actors, including political 
                                                 
16 Estadisticas de Comercio Exterior, Superintendencia Nacional de Administracion Tributaria, 
http://www.sunat.gob.pe/gestionTransparente/notatributaria/index.html 
17 According to the Sociedad Nacional de Mineria, Petroleo y Energia, the government collected 3 billion Nuevos Soles 
($874 million) in tax revenue from the mining sector, of which 50% ($437 million) is distributed to local governments 
as part of a law called Canon Minero (Mining Canon or Tax).  For more information: 
http://www.snmpe.org.pe/pdfs/Canon%20En%20Cifras/Canon%20Minero.pdf. 
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parties, governments, and civil society look for alternatives that will reverse this long-term economic 
failure. Peru is exceptional in that its economic growth under Toledo was reasonably good, but four 
years of such growth is not enough to restore public confidence in the neoliberal program offered 
by more traditional candidates such as Flores Nano. This is especially true in Peru’s case since the 
economic growth of the last four years does not seem to have had much positive impact on 
employment and only a limited impact on poverty. 
 
Nationalistic campaigns that advocate capturing more of the rents from oil and mineral extraction, 
as is the case with Humala, also have an economic basis as a result of the increase in world prices for 
these commodities, as well as the successes so far in Venezuela and Bolivia. New norms and 
expectations are being established as contracts with foreign corporations are being re-negotiated in 
the energy industry, and as demands for more national control over these sectors increase. 
Argentina’s rapid economic growth of the last three years (averaging 9 percent annually), while 
implementing unorthodox economic strategies and refusing a number of IMF recommendations, 
has also increased the appeal of alternative policies and made them seem more feasible. So, too, has 
the rapid decline in the influence of the International Monetary Fund in recent years, which is 
related to the Argentine experience. Finally, the increasing reluctance of governments to enter into 
commercial agreements with the United States in which they put various sectors of their economies 
at risk and incur certain costs, in return for increased access to the U.S. market, also has an 
economic basis – since that market can now be expected to shrink over the coming decade. 
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